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Abstract—The United States (U.S.) space exploration policy 
has directed the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) to retire the Space Shuttle and to 
replace it with a new generation of space transportation 
systems for crew and cargo travel to the International Space 
Station, the Moon, Mars, and beyond. As part of the 
Constellation Program, engineers at NASA’s Marshall 
Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama are working to 
design and build the Ares I, the first of two large launch 
vehicles to return humans to the Moon. A deliberate effort is 
being made to ensure a high level of operability in order to 
significantly increase safety and availability as well as 
reduce recurring costs of this new launch vehicle. It is the 
Ares Project’s goal to instill operability as part of the 
requirements development, design and operations of the 
vehicle. This paper will identify important factors in launch 
vehicle design that affect the operability and availability of 
the system. Similarities and differences in operational 
constraints will also be compared between the Saturn V, 
Space Shuttle and current Ares I design. Finally, potential 
improvements in operations and operability for large launch 
vehicles will be addressed. From the examples presented, 
the paper will discuss potential improvements for 
operability for future launch vehicles. 1 2
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1. INTRODUCTION
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) is charting a renewed course for exploration, with 
the fielding of a new human-rated space transportation 
system to replace the venerable Space Shuttle, which will be 
retired after construction is completed on the International 
Space Station (ISS). Powering the future of U.S. space
exploration will be the Ares I crew launch vehicle, which 
will transport the Orion crew exploration vehicle to orbit 
where it will rendezvous with the ISS or the Altair lunar 
lander, which will be delivered by the Ares V cargo launch 
vehicle. This new exploration infrastructure will allow 
astronauts to once again leave low-Earth orbit for extended 
lunar missions and preparation for the first long-distance 
journeys to Mars [1].
NASA’s Constellation Program is the corner stone of 
America’s space exploration policy. The schedules, 
vehicles, and an overview of the strategy are important to 
understand as key pieces of a sustainable and robust 
roadmap for exploration. While new technologies, 
complicated spacecraft designs and a stirring plan for lunar 
rediscovery are all elements of Constellation, arguably the 
most important concept of all is the focus that NASA is 
placing on operability of the spacecraft and facilities. For it 
is this focus that will enable the growth and acceleration of 
exploration, and allow for development budgets and 
experienced designers when it is time for future elements 
such as heavy lift launchers, landers, surface habitats, and 
eventual ly  Mars  exp loration spacecraft (design and 
development in parallel with operations) [2].
After describing the Constellation Program strategy and 
roadmap, this paper will look back at NASA’s two previous 
and highly successful crewed launch vehicles; the Saturn V
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2from the first lunar campaign; and the Space Shuttle, the
world’s first reusable spacecraft. The paper will describe
what operability for a launch vehicle means in terms of 
design requirements and availability. The paper will then 
compare and contrast operations concepts and constraints of 
the Saturn V, Space Shuttle launch vehicle to Ares. From 
the examples presented, the paper will discuss potential 
improvements for operability for large launch vehicles. 
Finally conclusions will be presented that outline ways that 
NASA is working to streamline operational concepts and
design for operability, which will reduce lifecycle costs and 
promote sustainable space exploration.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTELLATION 
PROGRAM AND ARES LAUNCH VEHICLES
The U.S. Space Exploration Policy was enacted in 2004, 
was authorized into law by Congress and is articulated in 
NASA’s 2006 Strategic Plan. NASA’s goals regarding 
exploration are:
 Complete  In ternat ional  Space  Sta t ion (ISS)
construction
 Retire the Space Shuttle after 2010
 Launch the Orion crew exploration vehicle by 2014
 Return to the Moon by 2020
 Extend human presence across the solar system
 Implement a sustained human & robotic program 
NASA recognizes that Space Shuttle missions and ISS 
expeditions are active parts of exploration. New lessons and 
techniques for living and working in space are learned on 
every mission. Improvements in planned operations for the 
Constellation vehicles are based on these lessons as well as 
from other launch vehicles and space systems [3].
The ultimate goal of Constellation is to explore beyond the 
boundaries of our current capability. To accomplish this and 
the other goals listed above, new vehicles must be 
developed that have increased performance over existing 
systems and have a lower operating and life cycle cost. The 
current operational concept envisions a fleet of vehicles 
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 – The Constellation Fleet of Vehicles
NASA's newest rockets, named for the Greek god Ares, will 
return humans to the Moon and later take them to Mars. The 
Ares I will be able to place 56,000 lb (25,400 kg) in low-
Earth orbit. Ares V will be used to carry cargo and the 
components needed to go to the Moon and later to Mars. It 
will be able to lift more than 410,000 lbs (185,970 kg) to 
low-Earth orbit.
The Orion spacecraft will be capable of carrying crew and 
cargo to the ISS. It will also be able to rendezvous with a 
lunar landing module in low-Earth orbit to carry crews to 
the Moon. Orion’s design borrows its shape from the 
capsules of the past, but takes advantage of 21st century 
technology in computers, electronics, life support, 
propulsion and thermal protection systems. Altair, the lunar 
lander launched by the Ares V, will be capable of landing 
four astronauts on the Moon, providing life support and a 
base for weeklong initial surface exploration missions and 
returning the crew to the Orion spacecraft that will bring 
them home to Earth.
Ares I and Ares V – New Launch Vehicles for Exploration
The Ares Projects Office at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight 
Center in Huntsville, Alabama is tasked to provide the Ares 
I crew launch vehicle and Ares V cargo launch vehicle 
space transportation systems. Safe, reliable, and cost-
effective space transportation is a foundational piece of 
America’s future in space. And thus, NASA has developed 
an aggressive, yet realistic, multiyear plan and has 
implemented a rigorous systems engineering approach [2].
Figure 2 reflects the schedule to develop and implement the 
Constellation Program and achieve the goal of returning 
humans to the lunar surface by 2020 [4].
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3Figure 2 – NASA’s Space Exploration Roadmap
Ares I – Mission and System Description
The Ares I is a Space Shuttle-derived two-stage launch 
vehicle. The Ares I is comprised of a five-segment reusable 
solid rocket first stage booster, and an upper stage, which is 
a liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) system 
powered by a single J2X engine. More details regarding the 
Ares I vehicle elements are described below. There are two 
missions currently planned for the Ares I. The first is to 
provide services to the ISS. The second mission is to deliver 
the Orion with crew to a low-Earth orbit to rendezvous with 
the Ares V Earth Departure Stage. Figure 3 shows the Ares I 
and Ares V elements and Figure 4 provides a direct 
comparison of the Shuttle, Ares and Saturn vehicles [1].
Figure 3 – Configurations of the Ares I and Ares V
Ares I First Stage
The Ares I First Stage (FS) five-segment solid rocket motor 
provides the main thrust to lift the Ares I vehicle off the 
launch pad to an altitude of approximately 194,000 feet (59 
km). On the pad, the Ares I FS supports the entire weight of 
the vehicle and transmits the weight load through the 
st ruc ture  to  a mobile launch platform and 
stability/dampening arm connected to the launch umbilical 
tower. The Ares I FS has a sea-level thrust of 3.3 million lbs 
(14,679 kN) at launch. It provides 100 percent of the thrust 
at liftoff and accelerates the Ares I to over 3,000 miles per 
hour (4,828 km/hr) before separating from the Upper Stage. 
Ares has a project goal to recover and reuse a majority of 
the components of the FS and thus they are being designed 
for 20 flights. To facilitate this,  a deceleration parachute 
system is required to provide velocity and attitude control 
from separation to water impact. The FS is made up of a 
forward assembly, aft assembly and five solid rocket motor
casting segments. The segmented motor design provides 
flexibility in fabrication, transportation, and handling. The 
FS forward assembly includes the deceleration system as 
well as the majority of the avionics components. The 
forward assembly also provides the interface with the Upper 
Stage [1].
The five-segment motor design was derived from the Space 
Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket  Motor (RSRM). To 
distinguish the five-segment motor from RSRM, it has been 
designated the RSRMV, with the “V” representing five 
segments instead of the four segments utilized on RSRM. 
The RSRMV’s subsystem consists of a combination of 
heritage solid rocket booster hardware and new hardware 
designed to meet the Ares requirements.
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4Figure 4 – Launch Vehicle Comparisons
Ares I Upper Stage
The Ares I Upper Stage extends from the FS forward 
frustum to the Orion adapter. The Upper Stage provides the
control electronics for the entire Ares I launch stack, as well 
as the systems required to perform FS separation.
The Upper Stage consists of three major components: the 
Instrument Unit (IU), the Core Stage (also called the Tank 
Assembly) and the Interstage. The IU contains the flight 
computers and critical avionics for control of the Ares I 
vehicle until separation with Orion. The Core Stage contains 
the main propulsion system including the LOX/LH2 fuel 
tanks, pressurization systems and feed lines to the Upper 
Stage J2X engine. The Upper Stage provides hydraulic 
thrust vector control for the J2X Engine. The Interstage is a 
cylindrical section that joins the FS to the Upper Stage and 
encloses the J2X engine until FS separation.
Ares I J2X Upper Stage Engine
The J2X is a derived version of the Apollo-era J-2 engine. 
Design differences between J2X and the original J-2 are 
intended to increase reliability, implement current human-
rating requirements, increase performance, optimize vehicle 
integration, improve producibility, and overcome design 
obsolescence issues.
The J2X engine is a gas generator cycle, using cryogenic 
LOX and LH2 for propellants and is designed to operate as 
a highly reliable, high-performance, restartable, upper stage 
engine. The J2X system consists of inlet ducts, gimbal 
subsystem, ancillary subsystem, hot gas and heat exchanger 
subsystem, oxidizer turbo pump, fuel turbo pump, gas 
generator subsystem, main injector, main combustion 
chamber, nozzle, nozzle extension, start subsystem, gas 
generator and main injector ignition subsystem, control 
subsystem (engine control unit, instrumentation, cables and 
connectors, instrumentation conditioning), propellant 
valves, ancillary valves, and pneumatics.
Figures 3 and 4 also shows major components of the Ares V 
based upon preliminary designs.  Due to the immaturity of 
the Ares V, this paper will focus on the design and 
operability Ares I. It is worth noting that current lunar 
operations scenarios call for the Ares I & V to be launched 
within 90 minutes of each other and thus emphasizing a key 
driver in high availability and operability [1].
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5V AND SPACE SHUTTLE
Now that the reader has been introduced to the baseline 
design for NASA’s newest launch vehicle, let’s take a quick 
look back at the two previous and highly successful vehicles 
s o  w e  c a n  compare and contrast their operability
characteristics.
Saturn V – Mission and System Description
The primary mission of the Saturn V launch vehicle was to 
place the Apollo spacecraft and lunar lander onto a trans-
lunar trajectory. This fundamental requirement led to the 
design of the largest launch vehicle ever developed. Figure 
5 shows some basic characteristics of the Saturn V as well 
as its capabilities [6].
Figure 5 – Saturn V Launch Vehicle Characteristics
The Saturn vehicles were the product of a long evolutionary 
process stemming from initial studies in 1950s of the 
Redstone and Jupiter rockets. Early conceptual studies 
included missiles such as Thor and Titan, and considered 
payloads ranging from Earth orbiting satellites to manned 
spacecraft such as Dynasoar, Mercury, Gemini and 
eventually Apollo [6].
The Saturn V evolved from the earlier Saturn vehicles as a 
result of the decision in 1961 to proceed with the human 
lunar missions. As the Apollo mission definition became 
clear, conceptual design studies were made, considering 
such parameters as structural, staging, and propulsion 
dynamics. Trade-offs were made in certain areas to optimize 
the design, based on mission requirements. The best 
combination of design parameters for liquid propellant 
vehicles resulted in low accelerations and low dynamic 
loads. Reliability, performance and weight were among 
primary factors considered in optimizing the design, 
operability and life cycle costs were not.
The Saturn V consisted of three propulsive stages – the S-IC
first stage, S-II second stage, the S-IVB third stage; and the 
Instrument Unit that contained the primary avionics and 
control systems. All three stages used LOX as an oxidizer. 
The S-IC used RP-1 for fuel, while the second and third 
stages used LH2. The second and third stages also used 
small solid-fuelled ullage motors that helped to separate the 
stages during ascent and to ensure that the liquid propellants 
were in proper position to be drawn into the pumps. The 
Saturn V flight history is shown in Table 1 [5].
Figure 6 – Launch of a Saturn V
Table 1 - Saturn V Launch History
Launch Date Launch Vehicle Mission
Nov 9, 1967 SA-501 Apollo 4
April 4, 1968 SA-502 Apollo 6
Dec 21, 1968 SA-503 Apollo 8
March 3, 1969 SA-504 Apollo 9
May 18, 1969 SA-505 Apollo 10
July 16, 1969 SA-506 Apollo 11
Nov 14, 1969 SA-507 Apollo 12
April 11, 1970 SA-508 Apollo 13
Jan 31, 1971 SA-509 Apollo 14
July 26, 1971 SA-510 Apollo 15
April 16, 1972 SA-511 Apollo 16
Dec 7, 1972 SA-512 Apollo 17
May 14, 1973 SA-513 Skylab
S-IC First Stage
The S-IC was built by The Boeing Company at the Michoud 
Assembly Facility (MAF) near New Orleans, where the 
Space Shuttle External Tanks are constructed today. Most of
its mass, over two thousand metric tons at launch, was 
propellant, in this case RP-1 rocket fuel and LOX. It was 
138 feet tall (42 m) and 33 feet (10 m) in diameter, and 
provided over 7.6 million lbs (33,806 kN) of thrust to get 
6the Saturn V through the first 33 nautical miles (61 km) of 
ascent. Five F-1 engines were arranged in a cross pattern. 
The center engine was fixed, while the four outer engines 
could be hydraulically gimbaled [6].
S-II Second Stage
The S-II stage was built by North American Aviation in
California. Using LH2 and LOX, it had five J-2 engines in a 
cross arrangement similar to the S-IC, also using the outer 
engines for control. It was 81 feet tall (24.6 m) with a 
diameter of 33 feet (10 m), and is the largest cryogenic stage 
ever built. The S-II stage accelerated the Saturn V through 
the upper atmosphere with 1,150,000 lbs (5,115 kN) of 
thrust. When loaded, more than 90 percent of the mass of 
the stage was propellant. Instead of having a traditional
intertank structure to separate the two fuel tanks, as was 
done in the S-IC, the S-II used a common bulkhead that was 
constructed from both the top of the LOX tank and bottom 
of the LH2 tank. It consisted of two aluminum sheets 
separated by a honeycomb structure. This had to insulate 
against the 125°F (51°C) temperature difference between 
the two tanks. The use of a common bulkhead saved 3.6 
metric tons. As a point of similarity, the Ares I will also use
a common bulkhead in the Upper Stage [5].
S-IVB Third Stage
The S-IVB was built by the Douglas Aircraft Company in
California. It had one J-2 engine and used the same fuel as 
the S-II. The S-IVB also used a common bulkhead to 
insulate the two tanks. It was 58 feet (17.6 m) tall with a 
diameter of 21.7 feet (6.6 m) and was also designed with 
high mass efficiency, though not quite as aggressively as the 
S-II. This stage was used twice during the mission: first in a 
2.5 minute burn for orbit insertion and later for the trans-
lunar injection (TLI) burn, lasting about 6 minutes. Two 
liquid-fueled auxiliary propulsion system (APS) units 
mounted at the aft end of the stage were used for attitude 
control during the parking orbit and the trans-lunar phases 
of the mission. The two APSs were also used as ullage 
engines to help settle the fuel prior to the TLI burn. The S-
IVB was the only rocket stage of the Saturn V small enough 
to be transported by plane [6].
Saturn V Instrument Unit
The Saturn V Instrument Unit (shown in figure 7) was built 
by IBM in Huntsville, Alabama and rode atop the S-IVB 
stage. This set of avionics and inertial guidance computer 
controlled the operations of the rocket from just before 
liftoff until the S-IVB was discarded. It included guidance 
and telemetry systems for the rocket. By measuring the 
acceleration and vehicle attitude, it could calculate the 
position and velocity of the rocket and correct for in flight 
deviations.
Figure 7 – The Saturn V Instrument Unit
Ending the Saturn Project
After the launch of Skylab in 1973, NASA was already 
transitioning to the Space Shuttle Program and there were 
no immediate requirements for a launch vehicle with such 
massive lift capability. This capability has not been equaled 
since. However to put the costs in perspective, from 1964 to
1973, a total of $6.5 billion was appropriated for the Saturn 
V, with the maximum being $1.2 billion in 1966. In 1966, 
NASA also received its highest budget of $4.5 billion, about 
0.5 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product at that time. 
Allowing for inflation this is equivalent to roughly $40 
billion in 2008. This works out at an amortized cost of 
approximately $3 billion per launch. No doubt, one of the 
main reasons for concluding the Apollo program was cost.
However, it is important to note that operability and low life 
cycle costs were not the highest priorities [6].
Space Shuttle – Mission and System Description
In 1969, a few months after Apollo 11, a space task group 
appointed by the President to study the future of space 
research and exploration made the recommendation that the 
U.S. accept the basic goal of a balanced human and robotic 
space program. To achieve this goal it was recommended 
that NASA develop new systems for space operation 
through a program directed toward development of a new, 
more affordable space transportation capability. In 1970, 
NASA initiated extensive engineering, design and cost 
studies covering a wide variety of concepts ranging from a 
fully reusable human rated booster and orbiter to dual strap-
on solid propellant rocket motors and an expendable liquid 
propellant tank. In-depth studies of each concept evaluated 
development risks and costs in relation to the operational 
suitability and the overall economics of the entire system.
Finally in January, 1972 NASA announced it would proceed 
with the development of a reusable Space Shuttle system.
The decision was based on information developed by 
studies which showed that the solid rocket system offered 
lower development cost and lower technical risk. In 1981 
the orbiter Columbia launched the Space Shuttle era [7].
7Space Shuttle Components
The Space Shuttle launch vehicle has three main 
components: the Orbiter, the External Tank (ET), and Solid 
Rocket Boosters (SRBs). Figure 8 shows all components at 
launch.
Figure 8 – Launch of the Space Shuttle
Space Shuttle Orbiter
Built by Rockwell International in California, the four 
original orbiter spacecraft were the Columbia, Challenger, 
Atlantis and Discovery. NASA named the orbiters after 
famous exploration sailing ships. In 1992, Endeavour was 
built to replace Challenger.
Table 2 – Space Shuttle Orbiter Launch Statistics
Orbiter First Launch Number of 
Launches
Columbia Apr 12, 1981 28
Challenger** Apr 4, 1983 10
Discovery Aug 30, 1984 35
Atlantis Oct 3, 1985 29
Endeavour May 7, 1992 21
* Columbia – Destroyed on reentry Feb 1, 2003, STS -107
**Challenger – Destroyed on ascent, Jan 28, 1986, STS-51L
The orbiter is the crew and payload carrying unit of the 
Shuttle system. It is 121 feet (37 m) long, has a wingspan of 
79 feet (24 m), and weighs approximately 150,000 lbs 
(68,040 kg) without fuel. It is about the size and weight of a 
DC-9 commercial air transport. An orbiter can transport a 
payload up to 65,000 lbs (29,480 kg) into orbit. It carries its 
cargo in a payload bay 60 feet (18 m) long and 15 feet (4.5 
m) in diameter. The bay is flexible enough to provide 
accommodations for robotic spacecraft, large experiments, 
space station elements or even fully equipped scientific 
laboratories. The orbiter's three main liquid rocket engines 
each have a thrust of 470,000 lbs (2,090 kN). During ascent 
they are fed propellants from the ET. The orbiters are 
transported before and after their missions atop a specially 
outfitted Boeing 747, shown in Figure 9 [8].
Figure 9 – Space Shuttle and 747 Carrier
Space Shuttle External Tank
Manufactured by Lockheed Martin at the Michoud 
Assembly Facility in Louisiana, the ET is 154 feet (47 m)
long and 28.6 feet (8.7 m) in diameter. After manufacturing 
is completed, the ET is transported by barge from Louisiana 
to Florida. At lift off, the tank holds 1,550,000 lbs (703 mT)
of LH2 and LOX. The hydrogen and oxygen are in separate 
pressurized compartments of the tank. The ET does not use 
a common bulkhead design. The ET is the only part of the 
shuttle system that is not reusable.
Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters
Manufactured in Utah by ATK, the shuttle SRBs are the pair 
of large solid rockets used by the Space Shuttle during the 
first two minutes of powered flight. They are located on 
either side of the ET. Each SRB produces 1.8 times more 
liftoff thrust than a single Saturn V F-1 engine with a sea 
level thrust of 2,600,000 lbs (11,565 kN). The SRBs are the 
largest solid-fuel rocket motors ever flown, and the first to 
be used for primary propulsion on human spaceflight 
missions. The spent SRBs are recovered from the ocean, 
refurbished, reloaded with propellant, and reused for several 
missions. The SRB segments are transported between Utah 
and Florida by specially designed rail cars.
Figure 10 – Space Shuttle Mission Profile
84. WHAT IS OPERABILITY AND HOW DO YOU 
DESIGN IT INTO A LAUNCH VEHICLE?
There are many definitions of operability used within the 
aerospace industry and it is important to scope the general 
definition of this term. The Constellation Program defines
operability as “the ability of a system to be operated for a 
specified duration under specified operating conditions at a 
specified capability with specified resources.” The key 
components of which are Duration, Operating Conditions, 
Capability, and Resources are described below [2]. It is a 
complicated definition that does not lend itself to easy 
interpretation.  However, if taken in parts, the implications 
of requirements and design decisions start to become clear.
Duration
Duration is the period of time or number of cycles the 
system can be made to perform its intended function—this 
may be minutes, hours, days, or longer; it can also be the 
number of sorties; or number of openings/closings. Duration 
is a function of the system capability, operating conditions, 
and resources. This makes system duration a dependent 
variable and,  because i t  is  dependent on operating 
conditions, is uncontrollable. An example of duration for 
Ares is the pre-launch countdown phase. To maximize the 
operability of the vehicle it is desirable to minimize the 
countdown duration. However, due to constraints such as 
propellant fill rates, safety procedures and many others, the 
duration of the countdown becomes dependant on how the 
various systems are designed. Realizing this early in the 
design process and striving to maximize key operability 
factors can have a significant impact on the design.
Operating Conditions
Operating conditions describe the environments in which 
the system performs its intended function. These are also 
independent and uncontrollable variables. A system is 
designed with the capability to function within a range of 
conditions. Variations in the operating conditions determine 
the resource consumption rates and induce failures and 
thereby determine duration. Launch vehicle operating 
conditions include temperature, pressure, humidity, winds, 
facility and safety constraints just to name a few. Internal 
conditions must also be considered and include combustion 
temperatures and pressures, heat generated by electronics, or 
physical stresses placed on crew members. For Ares, a key 
condition that has a huge impact on operability is the 
integration facility and its proximity to the launch pad. For 
maximum operability, a launch vehicle of this type should 
remain inside its integration facility for as long as possible 
prior to launch for protection and servicing. It is also 
beneficial to have a rapid transportation method between the 
facility and the launch pad. Ares will use heritage 
integration facilities like the Vehicle Assembly Building 
(VAB) and crawler transporter from the Apollo and the 
Space Shuttle programs. The 8-hour roll-out period from the 
VAB to the launch pad is a significant design driver for 
Ares with non-trivial impacts to operability. It drives a 
multitude of logistical decisions from how many launch 
platforms are needed, to ground support equipment 
resources and vehicle service points.
Capability
The capability of a system for its intended function
measures how well it accomplishes the assigned task—as a
result of the hardware and software configurations of the 
vehicle and supporting infrastructure. This is an independent 
and controllable variable and it determines how effectively 
the system performs its function. Once the system is 
deployed, its capability is considered to be variable only 
through failure or modification. In the countdown phase, the 
Ares launch vehicle capability is measured against number 
of attempts versus successful launches. For this category, 
system reliability is key – for ground as well as on-board 
systems. As with every launch vehicle, there is an enormous 
desire to minimize the number of launch scrubs, which are 
very expensive. For Constellation, this becomes even more 
critical for the lunar campaign due to the short time planned 
between Ares I and Ares V launches. 
Resources
Resources  a r e  the elements necessary to sustain 
performance of the intended system function. For a launch 
vehicle they include propellants, gases, electrical power, 
unique facilities, human mental and physical effort, as well 
as budgets just to name a few. These quantities may be fixed 
or varied. Resources are independent and controllable 
variables that result in another measure of system efficiency.
For Ares, a great deal of attention has been paid to areas of
the design that  require expensive,  l imited and/or 
environmentally hazardous resources. In some cases 
performance has dictated use of a costly consumable, like 
cryogenic helium, but these decisions are approved only 
after a great deal of scrutiny and trade studies exhaust all 
other options.
Managing Operability
Project managers have defined plans that drive operability 
and affordability into both the design and management 
decisions. In simplified terms, they infuse operability on a 
daily basis by specifying goals and allow engineers to assess 
various design options. Management tracks the results as 
well as what actions are necessary for implementing the 
options. The culmination of these activities and processes 
provide a prediction of the outcome of current design 
implementations and measure their anticipated affect on 
steady-state life cycle costs [4].
A primary operability goal is to significantly reduce annual 
recurring cost of the Ares I vehicle beginning in 2015 with 
the current baseline of two flights per year. This represents a 
recurring annual cost reduction of 50 percent from the Space 
Shuttle Program. This goal is driven by financial constraint -
NASA must carry the production and operations costs for 
the Ares I and also have enough resources available to 
continue the development of additional components such as 
the Ares V. As a result, it is imperative to establish targets 
9for the cost of operations and actively monitor and manage 
these. Another goal is to significantly increase probability of 
launch by 50 percent over that of the Space Shuttle [2]. The 
second is also driven by budget, but even more by the tight 
launch window constraints imposed by the Ares I-Ares V
lunar launch campaigns.
Another set of Constellation operability goals are designated
as “stretch goals.” These are aggressive constraints upon the 
entire Program (i.e. Ares, Orion and ground elements) and 
usually require discontinuous changes in design or 
operational concepts. They are selected such that the final 
systems can exhibit dramatic reductions in operational life 
cycle cost and/or improve system operability. A recent 
example includes examining a flight rate of 10 Ares I/Ares 
V combinations per year! In the end, operability will be the 
by-product of designing the vehicle for successful missions 
while concurrently optimizing for greater availability and 
process efficiencies, maximizing utilization of assets, and 
reducing life cycle cost.
Leading up to the Ares I Preliminary Design Review in the 
summer of 2008, great strides were made towards meeting 
requirements and operability goals. After the review was 
complete, operability requirements analysis and proposed 
design changes were documented i n  an operability 
assessment table similar to Table 3 below.
Table 3 – Ares I Operability Assessment Table (example)
Operability 
Impacts
Status
FS Off-Line 
Options Prior to 
VAB Integration
New launch mount approved per FS 
nozzle extension redesign
Common Battery 
Use
Action to implement use of common 
battery types across the whole 
vehicle, wherever possible
FS Forward Skirt 
Thermal Analysis
Current analysis shows purge not 
required in forward skirt
Manual Steering 
During Ascent
Increase in system complexity, test 
and training requirements were 
deemed acceptable due to increased 
operational flexibility.
Thrust Oscillation 
Mitigation 
Options
Design analysis to determine cause 
and options to mitigate first stage 
oscillations.
5. COMPARISONS OF LAUNCH OPERATIONS–
SATURN V, SPACE SHUTTLE & ARES I
It is interesting and very useful to directly compare the 
Saturn V, Shuttle and Ares vehicles through the phases of
manufacturing, integration and finally flight operations. By 
comparing and contrasting the operational concepts to their 
operational realities, we discover if their design goals were 
achieved or,  as in some cases, turned into operational 
liabilities.
Manufacturing and Transportation
As stated previously, the Saturn V stages were built in 
separate facilities, far from the launch site.  The first two 
stages were so large that the only way to transport them was 
by water. In the case of the S-II stage, it traveled from 
California to Florida via the Panama Canal; quite a great 
distance and at significant risk considering weather and 
security for such a critical piece of flight hardware. The 
third stage and IU were carried by oversized transport 
aircraft. Manufacturing the elements closer to the launch site 
would have reduced physical risk as well as transportation 
time/cost. Another option would have been to transport the 
elements in smaller pieces for integration at the launch site.
Other factors such as existing manufacturing capability 
and/or politics may have influenced location choices at the 
time. It is important to note, however, that operability and 
cost control were not primary design objectives for Saturn.
The Space Shuttle Program heeded these logistical lessons,
as only the ET is transported by water over the relatively 
short distance from Louisiana to Florida through the Gulf of 
Mexico and Intra-Coastal Waterway. However, this still 
exposes the ET to potentially extreme weather, especially
during hurricane season. The SRB segments are transported 
between Florida and Utah via railcar with relatively simple 
yet effective security and protection from the elements. Note 
the forward and aft SRB segments remain at the Kennedy 
Space Center (KSC) for refurbishment to minimize transport 
costs. Orbiters are returned from remote landing sites back 
to KSC for their next launch via the 747 shuttle carrier 
aircraft (SCA). This is a secure method of transportation, 
however a great deal of Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
is needed to mate and demate the orbiters from the SCA so 
every effort is made to land at KSC [9].
Ares I will use a hybrid of both transportation methods due 
in part to design and budget constraints to reuse existing 
facilities and GSE. The Upper Stage will follow the Saturn 
heritage of shipping a fully constructed stage by barge from 
MAF. The FS segments will be manufactured in Utah and 
transported using similar processes as the Shuttle SRBs.
Vehicle Integration and Ground Processing
On arrival at the launch site, each Saturn V stage was 
checked out in a horizontal position before being moved to a 
vertical position in the VAB. NASA also constructed large 
spool-shaped structures that could substitute for a behind-
schedule stage until its arrival. These spools had the same 
height and mass and contained the same electrical 
connections as the actual stages. Once fully integrated to its 
mobile launch platform and launch tower in the VAB, the 
Saturn was moved out to the launch pad by an immense
tracked vehicle called the crawler. It carried the launch 
platform, and vehicle 3 miles (4.8 km) out to the launch pad 
in approximately 8 hours. See Figure 11.
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Figure 11 – Saturn V and Launch Tower Roll Out
Like Saturn, Space Shuttle integration occurs inside the 
VAB. The SRB segments are transferred from nearby 
checkout facilities, hoisted onto a mobile launcher platform
and stacked to form two complete SRBs. Then the ET is 
lifted and mated to the two SRBs. Finally, the orbiter is 
towed from the orbiter processing facility to the VAB, 
raised to a vertical position and mated to the ET. When 
assembly and checkout is complete, the crawler-transporter 
picks up the platform and assembled shuttle vehicle and 
carries them to the launch pad. The crawler used by the 
Space Shuttle is the same as that was used for Saturn. Note 
that the Shuttle launch tower is a fixed structure at the 
launch pad and not on the mobile platform. This architecture 
was chosen among other reasons, to allow for large payload 
installation or change out at the launch pad. It has the 
drawback of continuous exposure to weather [9].
Ares I integration and launch preparation will include a mix 
of Saturn and Shuttle processes. The FS will be stacked on a 
mobile platform and launch tower in segments inside the 
VAB, nearly identical fashion to Shuttle. Next the fully 
integrated Upper Stage will be lifted and mated on top. 
Finally the Orion spacecraft will be mounted on top. 
Constellation concepts call for nearly all integration tests to 
be performed inside the VAB. To minimize exposure to 
weather, the vehicle and launch tower will be taken to the 
launch pad only a few days before launch.
Figure 12 – Artist Concept of the Ares I on the Launch Pad
Countdown, Launch and Ascent
Approximately four days before launch, the Saturn V 
countdown began and the vehicle was subjected to final 
checkout and servicing operations. The final phase of the 
countdown started approximately nine hours prior to liftoff. 
During this phase, the cryogenics tanks were conditioned, 
loaded and pressurized. At T-9 seconds, the S-IC ignition 
command was given. At T-0 seconds, the launch commit 
signal was given, causing the hold down arm to retract.
At launch, the Saturn V rose nearly vertically from the pad, 
for approximately 450 feet (137 m), to clear the tower. 
During this period, a yaw maneuver was executed to 
provide tower clearance in the event of adverse wind 
conditions or engine failure. After clearing the tower, 
another maneuver was initiated to achieve the proper flight 
attitude. Maximum dynamic pressure was encountered at 
approximately 1 minute 24 seconds into flight. The S-IC 
center engine cutoff was commanded at 2 minutes to limit 
the acceleration to 4 G’s. At approximately 3 minutes the 
first stage was empty of propellants and jettisoned. During 
this period, ullage rockets were fired to seat the S-II 
propellant and the S-IC/S-II separation occurred. The S-II 
aft interstage and Apollo launch escape tower were
jettisoned 30 seconds later. At 9 minutes into flight, the 
second stage was jettisoned and the S-IVB inserted the 
vehicle into a 100-nautical mile (185 km) circular parking 
orbit [5].
Space Shuttle launch operations are controlled from the 
same Launch Control Center (LCC) used by Saturn. The 
countdown begins approximately 43 hours before the 
launch. ET tanking operations are begun in parallel with the 
activation of various vehicle systems. The final 10 hours of 
the count  include a  f inal  mission software update, 
completion of propellant system purges, loading of LH2 and 
LOX into the ET. At T-9 minutes, the automated ground 
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launch sequencers takes over and from this point, all 
functions in the count are under computer control. At T-10 
seconds, commands are issued for Space Shuttle Main 
Engine (SSME) ignition. At T-0 the ignition commands are 
issued to the two SRBs and the vehicle lifts off.
After clearing the launch tower, the shuttle executes a pitch 
and roll maneuver to align with the desired azimuth. Shortly 
after launch, the SSMEs are throttled down to minimize 
aerodynamic loads until maximum dynamic pressure has 
passed, about 60 seconds into flight. At approximately 2 
minutes, the SRBs have exhausted their propellant and are 
jettisoned. They subsequently parachute back to the Atlantic 
Ocean, about 150 miles (270 km) from KSC, and are 
recovered to be reused. The orbiter and ET continue their 
climb to orbit. SSME cutoff occurs about 8 minutes, 40 
seconds after launch. The ET is jettisoned and reenters over 
the Indian Ocean. The orbiter then adjusts its final orbit with 
orbital maneuvering engines and continues on with its 
mission.
Figure 13 - Artist Concept of an Ares I Launch
Ares I pre-launch and launch control activities will also be 
conducted from the KSC LCC. The Ares I will arrive at the 
launch pad 84 hours prior to launch. At T-6 hours, Upper 
Stage cryo-loading starts. The crew will be loaded into the 
Orion two hours before launch. Ares will be transferred to 
internal power at T-60 seconds and at T-0 the FS ignition 
command is issued. See Figure 13.
Due to its high thrust-to-weight early in flight, the Ares I 
quickly clears the launch tower. It will climb vertically for 
approximately 350 feet (105 m) then begin a roll and pitch 
maneuver to align with the launch azimuth. Maximum 
dynamic pressure occurs about 60 seconds into flight. The 
FS jettison occurs 120 seconds after launch after which, it 
parachutes down to the Atlantic Ocean, to be recovered. 
After the FS is clear, the J2X engine start command is 
issued and it achieves 90 percent thrust in approximately 3 
seconds. The Orion launch abort system is jettisoned 
approximately 30 seconds after J2X start. The J2X burn 
lasts for nearly 9 minutes placing the Orion in its initial 
orbit. The Orion/Upper Stage separation sequence occurs 
and the Upper Stage reenters over the Indian Ocean.
6. OPERATIONS & OPERABILITY IMPROVEMENTS 
FOR FUTURE LAUNCH VEHICLES
Lower Recurring Cost by Selective Component Reuse
As stated above, one of the enabling tenets of the Ares 
Project is the emphasis being put on minimizing recurring 
costs. The Space Shuttle Program made a deliberate effort to 
reuse f l ight  hardware wherever possible with the 
expectation that this would lead to a significant reduction in 
recurring costs. This made sense as in the previous program 
every Saturn V was new and certified for flight at a very 
high cost. In fact the high costs of refurbishment and 
recertification, particularly for the orbiter, has shown that 
reuse does not explicitly lead to lower recurring costs. With 
over 120 Space Shuttle flights, economics has shown that 
often it is less expensive and safer to build launch vehicles 
for only one flight, especially for components that are 
subjected to the high dynamic stresses of ascent and reentry.
Ares I is splitting the difference between Saturn V and the 
Shuttle. The Upper Stage structure is being optimized to 
take the stress of the required testing cycles and one flight 
only. The J2X engine is being designed for only one launch, 
thus avoiding the refurbishment design impacts built into 
SSMEs. The FS will be reusable, as experience from the 
Shuttle Program has shown that SRB segments can be cost 
effectively refurbished. An Ares trade study considered 
expendable solids to increase performance, but designs for 
more rugged, reusable segments offered significant long-
term cost savings.
Reducing Processing and Maintenance at the Launch Site
Another aspect of operability improvements that Ares is 
aiming for is through the reduction of lengthy and expensive 
unplanned maintenance activities at the launch site. Shuttle
Program experience has shown that when specialized and 
invasive procedures are needed to perform unplanned 
repairs, they are killers to cost and schedule. Prime 
examples have been ET cutoff sensor repairs and orbiter 
wiring maintenance. Detailed logistics studies have shown 
that where possible, these types of procedures should be 
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done at manufacturing sites to reduce cost and the impact to 
integration facilities and schedules. For example, if an Ares 
Upper Stage requires invasive and unplanned maintenance
after arriving at KSC, it will be shipped back to the 
manufacturing site and the next production Upper Stage will 
be used in its place. This will result in reducing the 
recurring refurbishment testing now done in the course of 
Space Shuttle launch processing thus translating into higher 
operability at less total cost.
Maximizing Availability Through Reliability and Logistics
The requirements for launch availability state that the Ares I 
must have a probability of at least 98 percent successful 
launch after the start of countdown. The Ares Project will 
meet this requirement though several strategies.
First and foremost in the Ares I design is a reliance on 
highly reliable components. This is critical when launching 
crewed and high value assets to space. However, the trade 
study impacts between using extremely reliable components 
and a reduction of system redundancy is not obvious. 
Historically in the development of crewed launch vehicles, 
there is a fundamental debate on how reliable a system must 
be, or how many “9’s” to have after the decimal place when 
calculating statistical system reliability. In the Ares I design, 
this discussion was born out of a decision of avionics 
redundancy. Initially, four sets of duplicate flight computers 
and critical flight control strings were base lined. However 
after the statistical analysis of the system reliability was 
calculated, it was found that a system of 3 redundant flight 
computers was essentially just as reliable.
Ares I launch availability is also increased due to a 
requirement for simpler and more streamlined launch pad 
operations. Following the lead of successful launch vehicles 
like the Atlas V and Delta IV, Ares will rely less on pad 
maintenance capability than in the Shuttle or even Apollo 
programs. This in turn will lead to a more efficient launch 
pad flow and smaller logistical footprint at the launch site
[10].
Inherently Safer Launch Vehicle Design
Finally, much has already been written about how the Ares 
I/Orion in-line design increases crew safety during 
countdown and ascent. Obviously the Orion crew capsule,
by being at the top of the integrated stack, has less chance of 
being damaged by debris as well as a better chance of 
launch abort system succeeding in the event of a failure. Not 
so obvious however is the increase in operability by directly 
removing hazards like those that led to the Challenger and 
Columbia disasters.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Today’s Space Shuttle launch operations are complex, time-
consuming and require a great deal of hands-on labor, which 
are results of decisions made early in both the Saturn and 
Shuttle Programs. To be fair, long term life cycle cost was 
not a design driver for Saturn because of the high priority to
land men on the Moon before 1970. The Shuttle Program 
started to attack operability, but in hind-sight, may have 
emphasized too much on reusability. The Constellation 
Program recognizes for sustainable exploration, a balance 
between performance, reusability and operability is 
essential.
The objective of this paper was to identify how launch 
vehicle operability can be significantly increased in the 
design process. Developing an operable and cost effective 
launch vehicle demands an innovative approach to 
developing systems. The Ares Project has studied many 
aspects from previous and current launch vehicle programs 
to design a more operable and cost effective human rated 
launch vehicle. Specifically, key findings in this paper are 1) 
Reusability doesn’t automatically mean reduced production 
cost; 2) Do as much integration and unplanned maintenance 
at the fabrication facilities; and 3) Close proximity and 
efficient transportation between the integration facility and 
launch pad are essential for high availability.
By carefully analyzing and reanalyzing preliminary
concepts, system requirements and operability goals early in 
the design process, the final system can benefit greatly. 
Making a conscious effort to consider the “illities” on the 
same level as performance and other traditional “hard-core”
engineering disciplines, will enable the Constellation 
Program to design, build and afford all the elements 
required for a truly balanced and sustained space 
exploration program for decades to come.
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NASA’s Plan for Space Exploration
• Safely fly the Space Shuttle and complete 
the International Space Station
• Develop and fly the Orion crew exploration 
vehicle no later than 2015
• Return to the moon no later than 2020
• Promote international and commercial 
participation in exploration
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NASA’s Path to Exploration
Lunar Outpost Buildup
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services for ISS
Ares I and Orion  Development
Altair Lunar Lander Development
Surface Systems Development
Ares V and Earth Departure Stage
Exploration and Science Lunar Robotics Missions
0605 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Operations Capability Development
(EVA Systems, Ground Operations, Mission Operations)
Orion and Ares I Production and Operation
Research and Technology Development on ISS for Risk Reduction
Space Shuttle Operations
Initial Capability
Lunar Capability
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Vehicles of the Constellation Program
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Current Constellation Launch Manifest
2009 IEEE Cruzen 7
Launch Vehicle Comparisons
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Space Shuttle Ares I Ares V Saturn V
Height:  56m
Gross Liftoff Mass: 2040 tons
25 tons to LEO
Height:  98m
Gross Liftoff Mass: 910 tons
22 tons to LEO
Height:  109m
Gross Liftoff Mass:  3310t
55 tons cargo to moon
66 tons to moon in dual-launch mode 
150 tons to LEO
Height:  111m
Gross Liftoff Mass:  2950 tons
45 tons to moon
119 tons to LEO
Upper Stage
(1 J-2X)
127 tons LOx/LH2
Lunar
Lander
Earth Departure
Stage (EDS) (1 J-2X)
253 tons LOx/LH2
Core Stage
(6 RS-68B engines)
1590 tons LOx/LH2
5.5 segment
2 RSRBs
Crew
Lander
S-IVB
(1 J-2 engine)
110 t Lox/LH2
S-II
(5 J-2 engines)
450 t LOx/LH2
S-IC
(5 F-1)
1770 t LOx/RP
5 - segment 
shuttle derived 
solid rocket 
booster
Crew
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Ares I Elements
First Stage
 Derived from Shuttle RSRM
 Five segments/Polybutadiene 
Acrylonitrile (PBAN) propellant
 Recoverable
 New forward adapter
 Avionics upgrades
 ATK Launch Systems
Upper Stage Engine
 Saturn J-2 derived engine (J-2X)
 Expendable 
 Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne
Orion CEV
Interstage
Instrument Unit
 Primary Ares I control 
avionics system
 NASA Design / 
Boeing Production
Encapsulated Service
Module (ESM) Panels
Upper Stage
 137.1 mT (302.2K lbm) LOX/LH2 prop
 5.5-m (18-ft) diameter 
 Aluminum-Lithium (Al-Li) structures
 Instrument unit and interstage
 Reaction Control System (RCS) / roll 
control for first stage flight
 Primary Ares I control avionics system
 NASA Design / Boeing Production
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Ares V Elements
Altair
Lunar
Lander
Interstage
EDS
J-2X
Payload
Fairing
RS-68
Loiter Skirt
Earth Departure Stage (EDS)
• One Saturn-derived J-2X LOX/LH2
engine (expendable)
• 10-m (33-ft) diameter stage
• Aluminum-Lithium (Al-Li) tanks
• Composite structures, instrument unit 
and interstage
• Primary Ares V avionics system
Core Stage
• Six Delta IV-derived RS-68 
LOX/LH2 engines (expendable)
• 10-m (33-ft) diameter stage
• Composite structures
• Aluminum-Lithium (Al-Li) tanks 
Solid Rocket Boosters
• Two recoverable 5.5-segment 
PBAN-fueled boosters (derived 
from Ares I first stage)
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What is Operability and
How Do You “Design It In” to a Launch Vehicle?
Constellation Definition of Operability:
“The ability of a system to be operated for a specified duration under 
specified resources.”
Key Operability Components: 
Duration – Time to Perform Functions
Operating Condition – Environments (Internal, External, Natural, Induced)
Capability – System and Subsystem Reliability
Resources – Everything Needed for Operation
ADAC-2B
ADAC-3
Evaluate Operability:
•Identify Operability 
Gaps of Design
•Compare from Design  
to Design
•Provide Initial  
Assessment Status
Investigate Causes:
•Trace Low Operability 
Areas to Subsystems
•Investigate the  
Cause; Determine    
Lack of Functionality
•Generate Action 
Plans
Track Progress:
•Capture & Monitor all 
Issues & Action Items
•Track Concerns 
Through Design  
Changes
•Evaluate/Analyze 
Design to   
Assess the Result
Products
Process
Supporting
Activities
Design Guidelines Action List Asses. Report
Assess design:
•Evaluate Design to 
Subsystem Level
•Collect SME’s Inputs
•Use Existing Design Data
•Assign Predefined 
Ratings
Document & Close:
•Finalize Assessment 
report
•Present findings to 
Chief Engineer
•Close out studies
•Update Lessons 
Learned
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Designing for Operability: 
Ares I Options and Examples
Manufacturing:
• Common use elements: batteries, fluids, pyros
• Simplify systems – especially avionics
• Use of previous designs and systems
• Reduce complexity where possible
Nominal Ground Processing:
• Off-Line operations prior to vehicle stacking
• Quick transition between integration and launch pad
• Automated checkout processes utilized
• Clean pad - minimized pad activities
Off-Nominal Ground Processing:
• High reliability components
• Balance access and repair capabilities
• Advanced fault detection and diagnosis techniques in 
development
Flight Operations:
• Automated operation with fault management systems 
• Thrust oscillation mitigation
• Contingency manual steering during ascent
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Saturn V Space Shuttle Ares I
Manufacturing 
and 
Transportation
Stages Built 
Separately
Manufact: approx 1 
year
ET’s built in 
Louisiana, SRBs 
processed in Utah, 
Orbiters in FL
ET Manufact: 
approx 6 months
First Stage (FS) 
processed in 
Utah, Upper Stage 
built in Louisiana
US Manufact: up 
to 2 years
Transportation 
Method
S-IC & S-II transport 
via barge
S-IVB & IU via air
ET transport via 
barge, SRBs via 
rail
FS segments 
transport via rail 
US via barge
Transportation Time Up to 70 days Up to 2 weeks Up to 2 weeks
Vehicle 
Integration
All Stages arrived at 
KSC, ready to stack
ET, SRB segments 
arrive at KSC, 
ready to stack
Orbiter processed 
at KSC
FS segments & US 
arrive at KSC, 
ready to stack
Orion processed 
at KSC
Stacking Time Approx 6 months Approx 2 months Approx 1 month
Roll out to Pad L-2.5 months L-1 Month L-7 days
Comparison of Ground Operations –
Saturn V, Space Shuttle and Ares I
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Comparison of Flight Operations –
Saturn V, Space Shuttle and Ares I
Saturn V Space Shuttle Ares I
Pad Ops and 
Countdown
Countdown Start:
L - 4 days
Countdown Start: 
L - 4 days
Countdown Start:
L - 2 days
Cryos Loaded T - 9 hours T - 8 hours T - 6 hours
Crew Loaded T - 3 hours T - 3 hours T - 3 hours
Internal Power T – 50 seconds T – 60 seconds T – 60 seconds
Ascent
3 liquid stages
Delivered spacecraft to 
LEO and trans-lunar 
orbits
All stages disposable
2 SRBs and 3 cryo 
SSMEs
Delivers orbiter to 
LEO
SRBs recovered, ET 
disposable
1st Stage: SRB 
(recovered)
Upper Stage: Cryo 
(disposable)
Delivers Orion to 
non-sustainable 
LEO
MECO Time 
& Final Orbit
MECO: 9min 20 sec
LEO: 100 nmi circ
MECO: 8min 40sec
ISS LEO: 220 nmi 
circ
MECO: 9min 50sec
Orion Sep Orbit: 70 
nmi (-11x100 nmi)
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Potential Operability Improvements for
Future Launch Vehicles
 Carefully study design and operation 
complexity of reusing hardware and not just 
production cost savings.
 Sparing philosophy - Use next vehicle in 
production line as spare
 Multiple access points to critical maintenance 
locations (Instrument Unit / Interstage)
 Increase availability through mature logistics 
plans
 Consider utilizing a “clean pad” approach. 
Minimize pad activities to reduce vehicle 
exposure and reduce complex ground 
support equipment.
 Efficient transportation between integration 
facility and launch pad
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Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to compare what 
Ares is doing in the area of operability 
requirements to what was planned on Saturn and 
Shuttle – and what ultimately came to fruition.
• Saturn V development was driven by performance 
and schedule – NOT recurring ops costs and 
operability.  
• Shuttle development WAS driven to reduce ops cost, 
but may have focused too much on reusability; early 
unrealistic flight rate planning also decreased cost 
projections.
• Ares is attempting to balance design emphasis 
between performance, cost and long term operability.
• Ares has established processes to rank operability 
goals, assess their effect on the design and allocate 
the requirements for those deemed cost effective by 
Project Management and Engineering.
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Thank you!
Questions?
